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Abstract
This paper examines the effects of changes in bank regulatory environment on the
risk, return, and liquidity characteristics of equity portfolios of U.S. bank holding
companies between 1997 and 2016. Using a comprehensive sample of bank and
hedge fund holdings data we examine the impact of the repeal of the Glass-Steagall
Act, the introduction of the second and third Basel Capital Accords, and the imple-
mentation of the Dodd-Frank legislation on institutional portfolios. We document a
significant increase in both the idiosyncratic volatility and illiquidity of banks’ port-
folios during the period of financial deregulation initiated by the formal removal of
restrictions prohibiting banks from engaging in securities trading. In contrast, the
subsequent reforms of the bank capital requirements system and the prohibition of
banks from proprietary trading activities lead to reductions in those metrics. Our
results suggest that banks’ restricted ability to engage in market-making can be off-
set by the activities of hedge funds, although the consequences of this substitution
for long-term market stability remain unclear.
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1 Introduction
Modern banking institutions are large, complex organisations which combine the tradi-
tional services of granting loans and maintaining deposits with a range of advisory services,
private wealth management, and securities trading. During the past two decades, both
the business models of banks and the regulatory environment within which they operate
have undergone a substantial transformation. The regulatory policy developments which
took place in the aftermath of the 2007 - 2009 Financial Crisis have not only led to a
significant reform of the bank capital requirements system, but also introduced laws re-
sembling those passed during the Great Depression of the 1930’s, prohibiting banks from
engaging in proprietary trading and certain other market activities.
In this paper, we examine the relationship between regulatory policy innovations and
changes in the return, risk, and illiquidity characteristics of the equity portfolios held by
U.S. bank holding companies. Our analysis focuses on the changes that occur between
1997 and 2016, a period incorporating the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, the introduc-
tion of the second Basel Capital Accord, the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, and the
implementation of the third Basel Accord. Our study formally evaluates whether bank
equity holdings are affected by the removal of legal restrictions preventing banking insti-
tutions from active participation in securities trading in the late 1990’s, the reform of the
regulatory market risk capital requirements system in 2004, the reinstatement of the laws
prohibiting bank proprietary trading, and the increase in bank capital requirements and
introduction of liquidity requirements in 2010.
To that end, we utilise difference-in-differences analysis assessing the significance of changes
in the characteristics of the bank equity portfolio relative to those exhibited by the market
portfolio and a portfolio comprising equity holding of a large sample of hedge funds. Our
results indicate that financial deregulation initiated by the repeal of the Glass-Steagall
Act results in an increase of both idiosyncratic volatility and illiquidity of banks’ equity
portfolios, while the subsequent policies aimed at improving banks’ risk management,
preventing them from engaging in proprietary trading, and increasing their reserves of
liquid capital, lead to reductions in the two metrics. While our findings suggest that the
reduction in risk and illiquidity of banks’ portfolios is in line with the broad objectives of
macroprudential policies, they also indicate that the reduced scope of banking institutions
involvement in financial markets may result in some of those responsibilities being taken
over by firms operating outside of the regulators’ direct oversight.
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2 Regulatory background and related literature
To the best of our knowledge, the question of the relation between changes in the regu-
latory environment in which banks operate and the risk and liquidity characteristics of
the equity portfolios they hold is not extensively explored in prior studies. Nonetheless,
our paper is closely related to the existing literature assessing the efficacy of universal
banking, exploring the role of banks as market-makers, and carrying out a cost-benefit
analysis of the bank regulatory reforms proposed by policymakers.
In a number of seminal theories of financial intermediation, such as Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), Diamond (1984), or Kashyap, et al. (2002), the function of a bank within an eco-
nomic system is typically limited to taking deposits from households and originating loans
to firms pursuing risky investment projects. While useful for analytical purposes, such
assumption simplifies the market activities universal banks are involved in. Motivated
by the onset of the originate-to-distribute model of bank lending and the rapid growth
of the market for securitised loans in the 1980’s, Gorton and Penacchi (1995) develop a
theoretical framework by relaxing a key assumption of Diamond’s (1984) model, namely
that loans are not marketable (as in the originate-to-hold model). This allows banks to
maximise their expected profits by optimally selling part of their loan portfolio while still
providing valuable credit screening services. More recently, Schleifer and Vishny (2010)
develop a model of financial intermediation in which banks respond to investor sentiment
in the markets in which they operate. They use their capital to securitise new loans
when asset prices are high, accessing short-term borrowing to expand their balance sheets
and maximise profits. The model demonstrates how profit-oriented loan securitisation
serves as a channel of transmission of security market fluctuations into the real economy,
resulting in investment cyclicality and increased systemic risk.
From a historical perspective, the emergence of the market for securitised debt and banks’
involvement in this matter is a relatively recent phenomenon. U.S. national banks began
establishing securities affiliates as early as 1903 in an effort to sidestep regulations banning
them from engaging in trading of bonds and stocks. In the 1920’s, many banks which
went on to fail during the ensuing economic crisis used such affiliated firms to underwrite
the equity and debt securities of their borrowers, who in turn used the proceeds from
the securities offering to pay off the debt owed to the bank. The 1933 Banking Act (the
Glass-Steagall Act) sought to rectify this perceived weakness of the banking system’s
architecture and to address such conflicts of interest by prohibiting any deposit-taking
institutions from engaging in any form of dealing in corporate securities. This resulted
in a de jure break-up of universal banks into separate commercial and investment banks.
Although the proponents of the Act claimed that banks deliberately underwrote low-
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quality securities to avoid incurring losses on their loan portfolios, Kroszner and Rajan
(1994) find no empirical evidence to support such arguments.
The Glass-Steagall Act remained in place until 1999 when its provisions were repealed un-
der the Financial Modernization Act (the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), although the rapidly
growing use of loan securitisation by commercial banks made it appear increasingly ob-
solete from the early 1980’s onwards. Furthermore, in 1987, some commercial banks were
authorised by the Federal Reserve Board to engage in trading of bank-ineligible debt and
equity securities through Section 20 subsidiaries. Evidence presented by Bhargava and
Fraser (1998) shows that large commercial banks, such as J.P. Morgan and Citicorp, cap-
tured over 20% of the market for asset-backed securities within the first year of operations
of their Section 20 subsidiaries. Although such subsidiaries were initially not allowed to
derive more than 5% of their gross revenue from bank-ineligible market activities over any
two-year period, the volume of their activity prompted the Federal Reserve to raise this
limit to 10% in 1989 and to 25% in 1996 (Cornett, et al., 2002). In effect, those regula-
tory developments allowed commercial and investment banks to merge and form universal
banks once again. Together with the growing interconnectedness of global financial mar-
kets and the rapid technological advances, this has led to a profound change in banks’
business models and the functions they serve within the financial system and the wider
economy. Indeed, some of the largest U.S. banking institutions have since become the
most important market-makers for a wide variety of securities, ranging from government
and corporate bonds, through over-the-counter derivatives, to equities.
The potential benefits stemming from the diversification of bank business activities are
examined in several studies, but there is no clear consensus on whether expanding the
range of services offered by a banking institution enhances its value and its resilience
to economic shocks. Cornett, et al. (2002) show that banks which establish Section 20
subsidiaries improve their pre-tax cashflow performance relative to other commercial and
investment banks, while, at the same time, not exhibiting any significant changes in their
risk measures. In contrast, Bhargava and Fraser (1998) note that while stocks of the
affected banks earn positive abnormal returns after the initial authorisation of Section
20 activities, the subsequent relaxation of the trading limits is associated with negative
abnormal returns and results in an increase in firm-specific risk. Studies by Stiroh (2004)
and Stiroh and Rumble (2006) find that while raising fees, trading revenue, and other
forms of non-interest income as a proportion of a bank’s net operating income reduces the
volatility of its profit and revenue, it also leads to an increase in an institution’s exposure to
insolvency risk. Furthermore, the formation of diversified financial conglomerates typically
results in a discounted valuation relative to the value of the individual business units
(Schmid and Walter, 2009), even though such mergers and acquisitions generate significant
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positive cumulative abnormal returns (Filson and Olfati, 2014). Importantly, however,
despite the increases in total and firm-specific risks (Geyfman and Yeager, 2009), greater
business diversification and reliance on non-interest income does not have adverse effects
on the quality and pricing of loans issued by banks (Abedifar, et al., 2018).
A key point raised by Wagner (2010) is that while diversification of business activities
undertaken at a financial institution makes it less likely to fail, it also results in an increase
in systemic risk, as ex ante unique banks become more exposed to the same risks. The
relation between bank asset commonality and systemic risk is further examined in a model
developed by Allen, et al. (2012), in which banks’ exposure to a common asset and reliance
on short-term debt result in failures when creditors receive an adverse signal about the
quality of the asset. More importantly, the systemic nature of universal banks’ activities
allows them to transmit shocks originating in the banking sector to other financial markets,
as concerns about the liquidity and solvency of key banking institutions can result in fire
sales of tradable securities that they hold (Diamond and Rajan, 2011), or even in a
complete impairment of the functioning of the securities markets in which they actively
participate (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). Recent examples of such adverse links
between the health of the banking sector and the functioning of financial markets include
the runs on short-term debt securities, such as asset-backed commercial paper or repo
agreements which occur in July and August 2007, sparked by the deterioration of the
quality of mortgages held on banks’ balance sheets (Brunnermeier, 2009, Gorton and
Metrick, 2012). Additionally, using a unique set of data on German banks, Abbassi, et
al. (2016) demonstrate that fire sales in securities markets can generate further negative
externalities, as banks with greater trading expertise reduce their credit supply during a
crisis in order to increase their investment in low-rated long-term securities.
The severity of the 2007 - 2009 Financial Crisis prompted policymakers to once again
review the regulatory framework within which banking institutions operate. Among other
objectives, they sought to safeguard the stable provision of traditional banking services
against the risks arising due to banks’ active participation in capital markets. In the
United States, the new policies were introduced in July 2010 when the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act) was signed into federal
law. The Act established a number of new government agencies tasked with increasing
the transparency of the U.S. financial markets and their resilience to systemic risk, with
additional provisions included under §619, known as the Volcker Rule, banning banks from
engaging in any proprietary trading of securities or sponsoring any type of privately offered
investment funds. In effect, the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act has brought some
of the regulatory restrictions first placed on the banking sector’s participation in broader
financial markets by the Glass-Steagall Act full circle.
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The analyses of the Act’s provisions undertaken by Duffie (2012) and Thakor (2012)
highlight the practical difficulties involved in distinguishing which activities should be
classified as proprietary trading and which as market-making. The authors claim that this
shortcoming of the Volcker Rule will have negative consequences for liquidity provision for
many securities. This prediction has since been empirically confirmed by Bao, et al. (2018)
who examine the trading behaviour of Volcker Rule-affected dealers in one particular asset
class, namely stressed bonds. Additionally, both reports suggest that the implementation
of the Volcker Rule may have adverse effects on the long-term stability of the financial
system, as financial institutions subject to considerable regulatory oversight reduce the
scope of their activities in the market, and will eventually be replaced by firms operating
outside the policymaker’s supervision. A number of studies highlight the role of hedge
funds in the supply of market liquidity. Aragon and Strahan (2012) demonstrate that
the stocks held by hedge funds operated by Lehman Brothers experience greater declines
in liquidity following the bank’s bankruptcy relative to stocks held by hedge funds which
did not experience a funding shock. Furthermore, Jylhä, et al. (2014) provide evidence
demonstrating that hedge funds supply liquidity to the market when market liquidity is
poor, and that the extent of this process is positively related to the fund’s size and the
strictness of its redemption restrictions.
Unlike other institutional investors, however, banks are required to comply with the strict
capital requirements regulations outlined in the Basel Accords. The first Basel Accord,
announced in 1988, included no provisions for market risk faced by banks, and while
this was rectified by the 1996 Market Risk Amendment (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, 1996), its provisions only applied to banking institutions with trading ac-
counts in excess of $1 trillion (Holod, et al., 2017). Although the second Basel Accord
announced in 2004 sought to introduce a more comprehensive regulatory framework and
to enhance the risk management practices of banks (Basel Committee on Banking Su-
pervision, 2004), its implementation was never completed as a result of the 2007 - 2009
Financial Crisis. Instead, the Committee announced the Third Accord in 2010, which
addresses systemic and liquidity risks in the banking system, and replaces Value-at-Risk
with stressed Conditional Value at Risk as the basis of calculation of regulatory capital
for market risk (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010). Importantly, under the
Liquidity Coverage Ratio regulations, bank equity holdings are eligible for inclusion as a
source of highly-liquid short-term financing (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
2013). More recently, the Committee announced the final details of the Fundamental Re-
view of the Trading Book, set to be implemented by January 2019, which aims to revise
the market risk framework and reduce the extent of regulatory arbitrage by restricting
the eligibility criteria for reclassification of assets held on the trading and banking books
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2016).
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The validity of Value-at-Risk estimates reported by banks has been challenged by sev-
eral studies. The regulators reliance on Value-at-Risk is criticised as early as 2002, with
Daǹıelsson (2002) suggesting that the model’s reliance on historical data does not allow it
to provide any useful information about banks’ riskiness in times of crisis. Furthermore,
the model of Alexander and Baptista (2006) demonstrates that mean-variance efficient
portfolios that are constructed in the presence of a Value-at-Risk constraint, are riskier
than those constructed in its absence. In a follow-up study, they find that although the
stressed conditional Value-at-Risk approach advocated by Basel III leads to a better out-
come than a Value-at-Risk constraint, it still results in suboptimal portfolio allocation
(Alexander and Baptista, 2017). Finally, Begley, et al. (2017) report that banks strategi-
cally report lower levels of risk in their trading books when they face a shortfall of equity
capital, and that such behaviour is particularly pertinent during periods of high systemic
risk.
Our study most closely relates to the analysis by Trebbi and Xiao (2017), who examine
the combined effects of the Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III on liquidity in the U.S. fixed
income market. The authors attempt to identify structural breaks in bond liquidity
measures and carry out a difference-in-differences analysis for matched bonds underwritten
by institutions affected by the Volcker Rule and by those that are exempt from it. The
study fails to identify any structural breaks and to uncover evidence of deterioration
of liquidity of the bond market. In contrast, our study focuses on the equity holdings
of U.S. bank holding companies, and examines the relation between regulatory policy
developments and changes in the portfolio return, risk, and illiquidity metrics over a
longer period, including the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, the introduction of Basel II,
and their subsequent replacement by the Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III.
3 Data and methodology
Our analysis centres on the stock holdings of the entire banking sector, rather than on
holdings of individual firms. Such an approach allows us to better capture the systemic
nature of banking institutions’ exposure to the stock market, and to consider the regula-
tory reforms’ impact on the operation of the banking system as a whole.
To construct the banking sector’s equity portfolio, we first collect the 13F filings data1
from Thomson Reuters for systemically important U.S. banks selected for assessment by
the Federal Reserve as part of the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review frame-
1All institutions managing investments in securities of $100 million or more must submit form 13F
to the Securities and Exchange Commission every quarter, disclosing the details of their equity holdings.
See https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-form13fhtm.html for further details.
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work,2 and for the key broker-dealer banks which failed during the 2007 - 2009 Financial
Crisis (listed in Appendix A). We then combine the firm-level holdings information by
aggregating the number of shares in each individual stock held by banks in a given quar-
ter.
This data is supplemented with daily price and trading volume information from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database for all stocks traded on the
New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and on NASDAQ. All security
holdings reported in the 13F filings associated with CUSIP identifiers which cannot be
matched with those of the stocks obtained from CRSP are removed from the dataset.3
We then assign portfolio weights to each equity position by calculating the end-of-quarter
dollar value of the position4 and dividing it by the corresponding end-of-quarter dollar
value of the entire bank portfolio. The portfolio is rebalanced every quarter to reflect the
changes in equity positions reported by banks. As with all studies utilising data derived
from 13F filings, one caveat of our analysis is that we are unable to account for the short
positions in stocks taken by banks, as such information is not publicly available.
We next form two additional equity portfolios, which serve as benchmarks in the subse-
quent analysis of changes in the risk and liquidity characteristics of bank equity holdings.
First, we form a value-weighted market portfolio comprising all the stocks obtained from
the CRSP database. Second, we form another institutional stock portfolio based on equity
holdings reported in 13F filings submitted by hedge funds. The two benchmark portfolios
allow us to control for changes in the overall market conditions during the sample period,
and to directly compare changes in the characteristics of equity portfolios held by financial
institutions subject to increasing regulatory oversight (banks) and by institutions which
operate on a largely unregulated basis (hedge funds).
To construct the hedge fund portfolio we first identify all investment funds which report
to the Securities and Exchange Commission listed in Eurekahedge and Lipper Hedge Fund
(TASS) databases, and then manually verify the company descriptions to confirm that
a selected institution operates solely as a hedge fund. This ensures that hedge funds
affiliated with, or directly sponsored by, banks are not included in the sample. This
prevents the inclusion of overlapping positions in the two portfolios we form. We then
match the manager identification numbers of the independent hedge funds with their 13F
filings, and repeat the previous process to construct the bank equity portfolio.
2See https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/ccar.htm for the details of the Comprehensive
Capital Analysis and Review framework, including lists of institutions selected for participation each
year.
3This ensures that the sample does not include holdings of non-equity securities or certain derivative
instruments also disclosed in 13F filings.
4A small number of stock-quarter observations is removed at this stage due to, most likely, a reporting
error, which results in implausibly large values of the respective positions.
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The information on institutional equity holdings derived from 13F filings is available from
the first quarter of 1980 to the last quarter of 2017 (at the time of writing of this paper).
However, due to concerns about the quality of the data reported in the early 1990’s and
the possibility of revisions to the 13F filings submitted more recently, we restrict our
data sample to the period beginning with the first quarter of 1997 and ending in the first
quarter of 2016.
Table 1 shows the number of unique banks and hedge funds in the data sample, the
number of stocks in each of the three portfolios we form, and the dollar values of the
portfolios at the beginning, the mid-point, and the end of the sample period. Note that
although the number of hedge funds in the sample is considerably greater than the number
of banks, their aggregate portfolios are of comparable size and dollar value across time.
Furthermore, as indicated in Bowe, et al. (2018), bank holding companies included in
this study control more than 80% of the total assets of the entire U.S. banking system,
making our bank portfolio highly representative of the entire banking sector.
Table 1: Sample overview
Variable Market portfolio Bank portfolio Hedge fund portfolio
No. of unique finan-
cial institutions
– 27 835















The table reports the number of unique banks and hedge funds in the data sample, the
numbers of unique stocks included in their aggregate equity portfolios and in the market
portfolio, the number of stock-quarter observations associated with each portfolio, as well
as their respective dollar values at the beginning, the mid-point, and the end of the sample
period.
For each of the three portfolios, we calculate daily close-to-close returns for all constituent
stocks and compute their value-weighted sum based on the 13F filings data. We then de-
termine the mean daily return, total risk, and the 5% Value-at-Risk of the portfolio by
calculating the average, standard deviation and the 5th percentile of daily portfolio re-
turns within each quarter. The resulting return and total risk measures are next used
to compute the Sharpe ratios of the portfolios. Additionally, we use the Carhart (1997)
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four-factor model to obtain the mean daily risk-adjusted portfolio returns, their idiosyn-
cratic volatility, and loadings on the four risk factors in each quarter T by estimating the
following regression:
ri,t = αi,T + bi,TMKTt + si,TSMBt + hi,THMLt +mi,TMOMt + ei,t (1)
where ri,t is the daily return on portfolio i in excess of the risk-free rate; αi,T is the mean
daily risk-adjusted return on portfolio i in quarter T ; bi,T , si,T , hi,T , and mi,T are the
portfolio loadings on the daily market, size, value, and momentum risk factors; and ei,t is
the residual.5
Finally, we calculate the mean portfolio Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure for each quarter








where Ai,t is the illiquidity measure of portfolio i on day t, wj,T is the weight of stock j in
portfolio i during quarter T , rj,t is the return earned by stock j on day t, and DV OLj,t
is the dollar volume of trading in stock j on day t.
All measures of return, risk, and illiquidity are winsorised at the 1st and the 99th per-
centile in order to minimise the adverse impact of observations with extreme values on
the precision of the estimates we obtain.
Our examination of the effects of changes in the regulatory environment on the character-
istics of banks’ equity portfolio is based on a difference-in-differences approach. To that
end, we first divide our data into four subsamples using the policy change announcement
dates to identify the most likely point in time when a switch to a new regulatory regime
occurs. Specifically, we use July 1999, when the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is signed into
law, June 2004, when Basel II is announced, and July 2010, when the Dodd-Frank Act
becomes federal law, as the cut-off dates when forming the four subsamples. Importantly,
due to close proximity between the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act and the announcement
of Basel III regulations in December 2010, we treat those events as a single regulatory
innovation in our analysis. Table 2 summarises the timeline of the reforms we study and
provides information on the duration of each of the four regulatory regimes.
5We obtain the data on daily risk factors from Kenneth R. French’s website, available at http://mba.
tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html.
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Table 2: Timeline of regulatory developments
Regulatory regime First quarter Last quarter Duration
Glass-Steagall Act and Basel I 1997:Q1 1999:Q2 10 quarters
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and Basel I 1999:Q3 2004:Q1 19 quarters
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and Basel II 2004:Q2 2010:Q2 25 quarters
Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III 2010:Q3 2016:Q1 23 quarters
The table provides an outline timeline of the regulatory developments examined in this
study, along with the start and end quarters and the duration of the regulatory regime
subsamples used in the difference-in-differences analysis we carry out.
Based on the discussion of the regulatory reforms presented above, our analysis assumes
that the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act corresponds to a reduction in the reg-
ulatory burden faced by banks, whereas the subsequent introduction of Basel II, the
Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III represents a move towards establishing a more restrictive
environment within which banking institutions operate. While we form no ex ante ex-
pectations about the impact of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and Basel II on the risk and
return characteristics of banks’ equity portfolio, we anticipate that the implementation
of the Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III should result in a reduction of risk and illiquidity
metrics of the portfolio.
To assess if the regulatory developments affect the properties of the banks’ equity port-
folios, we first calculate the difference between the risk and liquidity metrics for three
portfolio pairs: the bank portfolio and the market portfolio, the hedge fund portfolio and
the market portfolio, and, finally, the bank portfolio and the hedge fund portfolio. We
then test if the change in the mean and variance of the differences between the metrics
of the three portfolio pairs in the period following a new policy announcement relative to
the preceding period is statistically significant.
Such approach allows us to establish whether the variation in the characteristics of bank
and hedge fund portfolios is merely a reflection of the developments in the broader stock
market, and, if not, whether the changes in the regulatory burden faced by banks affect
their equity holdings vis-à-vis the stock holdings of unregulated hedge funds. Further-
more, as new policy compliance deadlines are frequently extended by the regulators to
give financial institutions more time to adjust their balance sheets and business models,
employing a difference-in-differences approach based on the full duration of a regulatory
regime allows us to capture the full impact of regulatory change on bank portfolio char-
acteristics, which could potentially be more challenging using a traditional event study
methodology which requires precise identification of policy implementation dates.
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4 Empirical results
4.1 Overview of changes in portfolio characteristics
The dollar values of the market, bank, and hedge fund portfolios have all increased sub-
stantially during the period we study. As shown in Figure 1, the value of the market
portfolio increased by a factor of 3.6 relative to its 1997:Q1 value during the sample pe-
riod. The values of the bank portfolio and the hedge fund portfolio both exhibit much
faster growth rates than the market portfolio, with the value of the former increasing by
a factor of 9.3 by 2014:Q1 and the latter growing by a factor of 8.14 during the same pe-
riod. The growth rates of the gross domestic product of the United States and the total
assets held by U.S. bank holding companies between 1997:Q1 and 2015Q:4 (increasing
by a factor of 2.1 and 4, respectively) reported by Bowe, et al. (2018), provide a useful
comparison, demonstrating how rapidly the bank equity portfolio has grown during the
sample period.
Figure 1: Indexed values of the market, bank, and hedge fund portfolios 1997:Q1 - 2016:Q1
The figure plots total dollar values of the market portfolio, the bank portfolio, and the
hedge fund portfolio relative to their 1997:Q1 dollar values, scaled to 100. The vertical
lines represent the bank regulatory policy change announcement dates. The shaded areas
correspond to recession periods as reported by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Figure 2a demonstrates that the value of the market portfolio increases from approxi-
mately $8.35 trillion dollars in 1997:Q1 to more than $28.5 trillion in 2016:Q1. As indi-
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cated in Figure 2b, the values of bank and hedge fund equity portfolios have grown from
$335 billion and $256 billion at the beginning of the sample period to more than $1.1 tril-
lion and $1.9 trillion, respectively, by its end. Additionally, Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate
the extent of damage inflicted on U.S. equity markets by the 2007 - 2009 Financial Crisis.
During the five quarters between the peak in the business cycle in December 2007 and
its trough in June 2009, the value of the market portfolio declined by approximately $10
trillion, whereas the valuation of bank and hedge funds equity portfolios was reduced by
$1 trillion and $500 billion, respectively. The effects of the Federal Reserve’s decision to
pursue unconventional monetary policies in the aftermath of the crisis, aimed at provid-
ing economic stimulus by lowering the long-term yields on a broad range of assets, are
reflected by the quick recovery of equity portfolio values beginning in 2009:Q1 and their
continued rapid growth until early 2015. In contrast, the impact of the bursting of the
Dot-com bubble and the recession in the early 2000’s is considerably less pronounced for
all three portfolios.
Figure 2: Dollar values of the market, bank, and hedge fund portfolios 1997:Q1 - 2016:Q1
(a) Market portfolio (b) Bank and hedge fund portfolios
Sub-figures (a) and (b) plot the total dollar values of the market portfolio, the bank portfolio
and the hedge fund portfolio, respectively. The vertical lines in sub-figure (b) represent
the bank regulatory policy change announcement dates. The shaded areas correspond to
recession periods as reported by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Note, that relative to the hedge fund portfolio, the value of the bank equity portfolio ex-
hibits considerably greater volatility following the 2007 - 2009 Financial Crisis. Although
the number of banks in our sample decreases following the crisis, due to failures or acqui-
sitions of distressed institutions, it remains quite stable in its aftermath. Consequently,
the higher volatility could be a reflection of the adjustment of banks’ business models
undertaken as a result of post-crisis regulatory developments.
Figure 3 reports the shares of the bank and hedge fund equity portfolios in the market
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portfolio. In 1997:Q1, the banks in our sample held positions accounting for approximately
4% of the entire market portfolio, increasing their share to 8% by 2008. During the same
period, the share of hedge funds’ holdings also increases by 4 percentage points, from 3%
to 7%. While hedge funds’ share has remained stable at 7% during and after the 2007 -
2009 Financial Crisis, the share of banks has first increased to more than 9% by 2010 and
has subsequently become more volatile. That notwithstanding, Figure 3 demonstrates
that bank holding companies remain an important class of institutional investors, and
that their participation in equity markets is of sufficient volume for changes in bank
regulations to generate spill-over effects affecting other financial markets.
Figure 3: Shares of the bank and hedge funds portfolios in the market portfolio 1997:Q1
- 2016:Q1
The figure plots the total dollar values of the the bank portfolio and the hedge fund portfolio
as a fraction of the dollar value of the market portfolio. The vertical lines represent the bank
regulatory policy change announcement dates. The shaded areas correspond to recession
periods as reported by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
We report the average annualised daily risk, return, and illiquidity metrics for the three
portfolios across the four regulatory regimes in Table 3. The results reveal that the bank
portfolio consistently generates returns that are lower than those produced by the market
portfolio, as measured by their average raw return rp. Furthermore, despite evidencing
lower total risk, σr, during the first three regulatory periods, the equity portfolio held by
banks is also associated with lower Sharpe Ratios throughout the sample period. The
average returns and total risk of the hedge fund portfolio exhibit patterns similar to the
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bank portfolio, with the exception of the period during which the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act and Basel I are in place, when it produces higher return and lower total risk than the
market portfolio.
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Table 3: Average portfolio return, risk, and liquidity characteristics
Market portfolio
Regulatory regime rp σr αp σe βMKT βSMB βHML βMOM V aR5% Ap SRp
GSA and Basel I 0.3076 0.1705 0.0416 0.0105 0.9982 0.0263 0.0173 −0.0160 −0.0161 0.0282 1.7727
GLBA and Basel I 0.1442 0.1969 0.1177 0.0130 0.9628 0.0104 0.0235 0.0071 −0.0185 0.0203 0.8658
GLBA and Basel II 0.0894 0.1872 0.0527 0.0131 0.9837 0.0087 0.0379 0.0367 −0.0200 0.0093 0.7972
DFA and Basel III 0.1523 0.1452 0.0096 0.0102 0.9691 −0.0044 0.0092 −0.0203 −0.0151 0.0056 1.3324
Bank portfolio
Regulatory regime rp σr αp σe βMKT βSMB βHML βMOM V aR5% Ap SRp
GSA and Basel I 0.0861 0.1257 −0.0269 0.0463 0.8976 0.7292 0.3009 −0.1085 −0.0129 0.5272 1.0684
GLBA and Basel I 0.1069 0.1595 0.0278 0.0590 0.7625 0.6040 0.4432 −0.1030 −0.0160 1.1778 1.0297
GLBA and Basel II 0.0421 0.1820 −0.0092 0.0364 0.7718 0.4842 0.1370 −0.0121 −0.0196 0.3642 0.4960
DFA and Basel III 0.0791 0.1506 −0.0242 0.0257 0.8331 0.5070 0.0849 −0.0671 −0.0156 0.1659 0.7797
Hedge fund portfolio
Regulatory regime rp σr αp σe βMKT βSMB βHML βMOM V aR5% Ap SRp
GSA and Basel I 0.0967 0.1300 −0.0398 0.0341 0.9233 0.6809 0.2851 −0.1363 −0.0132 0.3672 1.2601
GLBA and Basel I 0.1524 0.1726 0.0716 0.0413 0.8543 0.6127 0.3740 −0.0882 −0.0167 0.3431 1.1070
GLBA and Basel II 0.0265 0.1876 −0.0191 0.0338 0.7867 0.5004 0.1095 0.0012 −0.0203 0.3071 0.4197
DFA and Basel III 0.0741 0.1483 −0.0307 0.0260 0.8185 0.5081 0.0693 −0.0964 −0.0155 0.2404 0.7433
The table reports the means of the estimated return, risk, and Amihud illiquidity metrics for the market portfolio, the bank equity portfolio, and
the hedge fund equity portfolio across the four regulatory regimes.
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The underperformance of the institutional portfolios relative to the market portfolio is fur-
ther reflected by their risk-adjusted returns, αp, which in all four instances are lower than
those of the market portfolio, and with the exception of one period, negative. Figure 4a
plots the risk-adjusted returns of the bank and the hedge fund portfolios. It demonstrates
that the risk-adjusted returns of the bank portfolio exhibit considerably higher volatility
than the returns of the hedge fund portfolio during the period of deregulation following
the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Following the announcement of Basel II,
however, the risk-adjusted returns of the two portfolios display comparable patterns of
behaviour. This convergence is further illustrated by Figure 4b, plotting the idiosyncratic
volatilities of the two portfolios, which shows that while initially the firm-specific volatil-
ity of the bank portfolio is greater than that of the hedge fund portfolio, the two become
nearly identical in the period after Basel II is introduced. Additionally, the mean loadings
on the four risk factors used in the Carhart model indicate that both banks and hedge
funds exhibit similar patterns of changes in preferences for growth and value stocks, with
the coefficient on the size premium steadily declining over time, and the coefficient on
the value premium increasing during the second period in our sample and then steadily
declining.
Figure 4: Risk-adjusted returns and idiosyncratic volatilities of the bank and hedge fund
portfolios 1997:Q1 - 2016:Q1
(a) Annualised risk-adjusted returns (b) Annualised idiosyncratic volatilities
Sub-figures (a) and (b) plot the annualised mean daily risk-adjusted returns and idiosyn-
cratic volatilities of the bank portfolio and the hedge fund portfolio, respectively. The
vertical lines represent the bank regulatory policy change announcement dates. The shaded
areas correspond to recession periods as reported by the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
The Amihud illiquidity measure is the metric which demonstrates the highest degree
of dissimilarity between the three portfolios, as shown in Figure 5. Unsurprisingly, the
market portfolio is the least illiquid portfolio in our sample throughout the entire period we
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examine. In stark contrast, the bank portfolio is the most illiquid one during the first three
periods, exhibiting considerably greater illiquidity than the hedge fund portfolio during
the period when the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and Basel I are in place. The bank portfolio
then becomes less illiquid than the hedge fund portfolio following the implementation of
the Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III. Note that unlike in the case of the market or the hedge
fund portfolios, the illiquidity of the bank equity portfolio is the highest in the aftermath
of the Dot-com bubble and the early 2000’s recession, and not during the 2007 - 2009
Financial Crisis.
Figure 5: Illiquidity of the market, bank, and hedge fund portfolios 1997:Q1 - 2016:Q1
The figure plots the Amihud illiquidity measure of the market, bank, and hedge fund port-
folios. The vertical lines represent the bank regulatory policy change announcement dates.
The shaded areas correspond to recession periods as reported by the National Bureau of
Economic Research.
To establish whether the changes in portfolio performance metrics reported in Table 3 are
statistically significant, we carry out a test of mean and variance equality between the
quarterly estimates for the periods before and after a regulatory development takes place.
We report the test results in Table 4.
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Table 4: Changes in average portfolio return, risk, and liquidity characteristics
Market portfolio
Policy development rp σr αp σe βMKT βSMB βHML βMOM V aR5% Ap SRp
GLBA −0.1633 0.0264 0.0761∗∗∗ 0.0025 −0.0353∗∗∗ −0.0160 0.0062 −0.0232 −0.0024 −0.0079∗∗∗ −0.9069
(−1.03) (1.18) (3.23) (1.16) (−4.36) (−1.65) (0.29) (1.54) (−1.13) (−2.79) (−1.02)
Basel II −0.0549 −0.0097 −0.0650∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0209∗∗ −0.0016 0.0144 0.0295∗ −0.0015 −0.0110∗∗∗ −0.0686
(−0.51) (−0.29) (−3.63) (0.02) (2.59) (−0.17) (0.74) (1.72) (−0.44) (−4.54) (−0.12)
DFA and Basel III 0.0629 −0.0420 −0.0431∗∗∗ −0.0028∗∗ −0.0146∗ −0.0131∗ −0.0287∗ −0.0570∗∗∗ 0.0050 −0.0037∗∗ 0.5353
(0.76) (−1.37) (−3.64) (−2.11) (−1.80) (−1.70) (−1.84) (−3.03) (1.48) (−2.09) (1.15)
Bank portfolio
Policy development rp σr αp σe βMKT βSMB βHML βMOM V aR5% Ap SRp
GLBA 0.0209 0.0338 0.0547 0.0127∗ −0.1351∗∗ −0.1252∗∗ 0.1423∗ 0.0055 −0.0031 0.6506∗∗ −0.0387
(0.10) (1.70) (0.85) (1.84) (−2.68) (−2.10) (1.99) (0.10) (−1.32) (2.32) (−0.03)
Basel II −0.0648 0.0225 −0.0369 −0.0225∗∗∗ 0.0092 −0.1198∗∗∗ −0.3063∗∗∗ 0.0909∗∗ −0.0036 −0.8136∗∗∗ −0.5336
(−0.46) (0.73) (−0.87) (−3.75) (0.28) (−3.04) (−5.91) (2.06) (−1.12) (−4.07) (−0.64)
DFA and Basel III 0.0370 −0.0314 −0.0150 −0.0108∗∗ 0.0613∗∗∗ 0.0228 −0.0521 −0.0550 0.0040 −0.1983∗∗ 0.2837
(0.36) (−1.07) (−0.69) (−2.55) (3.33) (0.81) (−1.28) (−1.38) (1.30) (−2.15) (0.48)
Hedge fund portfolio
Policy development rp σr αp σe βMKT βSMB βHML βMOM V aR5% Ap SRp
GLBA 0.0557 0.0426∗ 0.1113∗∗∗ 0.0072 −0.0698∗ −0.0682 0.0889 0.0481 −0.0035 −0.0240 −0.0387
(0.28) (2.04) (3.23) (1.42) (−1.85) (−1.55) (1.52) (1.10) (−1.60) (−0.37) (−0.11)
Basel II −0.1258 0.0150 −0.0906∗∗∗ −0.0075 −0.0667∗∗∗ −0.1123∗∗∗ −0.2645∗∗∗ 0.0894∗∗ −0.0037 −0.0360 −0.5336
(−0.91) (0.47) (−2.84) (−1.40) (−2.78) (−3.86) (−6.67) (2.13) (−1.09) (−0.38) (−0.87)
DFA and Basel III 0.0476 −0.0393 −0.0117 −0.0078∗ 0.0318∗ 0.0077 −0.0402 −0.0976∗∗ 0.0049 −0.0667 0.2837
(0.44) (−1.32) (−0.45) (−1.80) (1.90) (0.32) (−1.36) (−2.53) (1.51) (−0.82) (0.55)
The table reports changes in the mean of the estimated return, risk, and Amihud illiquidity metrics for the market portfolio, the bank equity
portfolio, and the hedge fund equity portfolio, calculated as the difference between the portfolio statistics computed for the new regulatory regime
and the previous regime. t-statistics in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote 10%, 5% and 1$ level of significance.
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The results for the bank portfolio indicate that none of the reported changes in returns,
total risk, risk-adjusted returns, or Value-at-Risk metrics are statistically significant. We
find, however, that the reduction in idiosyncratic volatility of the portfolio during the
periods when Basel II, the Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III are in place are all statistically
significant. This potentially indicates that the increases in bank capital requirements
brought by the consecutive Basel Accords prompts banks to reduce the firm-specific riski-
ness of their investments in equities. Additionally, the changes in risk factor loadings which
occur in the period associated with Basel II are statistically significant for both banks and
hedge funds, and are also of a similar order of magnitude. This suggests that the shift in
the composition of the bank portfolio occurring during that time is likely a reflection of
broader changes in institutional investors’ stock characteristics preferences.
Most importantly, the results presented in Table 4 demonstrate that the changes in the
Amihud illiquidity measure of the bank portfolio are statistically significant throughout
the entire sample period. Although the increase in the liquidity of the market portfolio
is also statistically significant, the changes in illiquidity of the hedge fund portfolio tak-
ing place across the four regulatory regimes are statistically indistinguishable from one
another.
Both the bank and the hedge fund portfolios are well-diversified, as they comprise more
than half of all of the unique stocks included in the market portfolio. They are not,
however, uniformly distributed in terms of the weights attached to the individual stocks.
Indeed, we establish that a substantial proportion of the portfolios’ value is allocated to
approximately 10% of all the unique stocks held by banks and by hedge funds. Figure 6
plots the value of the positions with weights above the 90th percentile of the distribution
in each quarter relative to the value of the entire bank and hedge fund portfolios. It
demonstrates that the two portfolios are highly concentrated, as the largest positions
therein comprise between 85% and 92% of the bank equity portfolio, and between 71%
and 82% of the hedge fund portfolio.
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Figure 6: Value of the largest positions as a proportion of the portfolio value 1997:Q1 -
2016:Q1
The figure plots the cumulative value of the positions with weights above the 90th percentile
relative to the value of the entire bank and hedge fund portfolios, respectively. The vertical
lines represent the bank regulatory policy change announcement dates. The shaded areas
correspond to recession periods as reported by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
To establish whether the regulatory developments we analyse have homogenous effects on
all positions within the bank equity portfolio, regardless of their relative size, we form
additional small and large position portfolios by partitioning the sample around the 90th
percentile of portfolio weights in each quarter. We repeat this process for the hedge
fund portfolio to establish additional size-based benchmark portfolios. The weights of the
stocks included in the resulting portfolios are re-scaled so that they sum to 100% in order
to ensure comparability of their return, risk, and illiquidity metrics. Table 5 reports the
annualised daily return, risk, and illiquidity statistics for size-based bank and hedge fund
portfolios across the four regulatory regimes.
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Table 5: Average portfolio return, risk, and liquidity characteristics by position size
Smallest positions in the bank portfolio
Regulatory regime rp σr αp σe βMKT βSMB βHML βMOM V aR5% Ap SRp
GSA and Basel I 0.1093 0.1175 0.0039 0.0265 0.8622 0.7407 0.2924 −0.1244 −0.0120 0.5645 1.6078
GLBA and Basel I 0.1134 0.1482 0.0248 0.0386 0.7088 0.6302 0.4222 −0.1297 −0.0147 1.2698 1.0581
GLBA and Basel II 0.0150 0.1796 −0.0305 0.0310 0.7376 0.5104 0.1281 −0.0072 −0.0195 0.4071 0.3959
DFA and Basel III 0.0612 0.1498 −0.0404 0.0242 0.8084 0.5579 0.0809 −0.0837 −0.0156 0.1938 0.6700
Largest positions in the bank portfolio
Regulatory regime rp σr αp σe βMKT βSMB βHML βMOM V aR5% Ap SRp
GSA and Basel I 0.2829 0.1592 0.0744 0.0300 0.9978 0.0647 0.2096 −0.1236 −0.0149 0.0017 1.8736
GLBA and Basel I 0.1981 0.1936 0.1356 0.0408 1.0331 0.1302 0.2266 −0.0053 −0.0181 0.0007 1.0711
GLBA and Basel II 0.0801 0.1984 0.0508 0.0247 1.0145 0.0453 0.0584 0.0152 −0.0213 0.0002 0.7073
DFA and Basel III 0.1520 0.1496 0.0031 0.0179 0.9866 −0.0214 −0.0027 −0.0163 −0.0155 0.0001 1.2842
Smallest positions in the hedge fund portfolio
Regulatory regime rp σr αp σe βMKT βSMB βHML βMOM V aR5% Ap SRp
GSA and Basel I 0.1236 0.1217 −0.0074 0.0241 0.9011 0.7618 0.2961 −0.1196 −0.0123 0.4046 1.6162
GLBA and Basel I 0.1353 0.1661 0.0495 0.0331 0.8122 0.6747 0.4205 −0.1356 −0.0163 0.3956 1.0787
GLBA and Basel II 0.0235 0.1855 −0.0191 0.0306 0.7691 0.5469 0.1463 −0.0135 −0.0202 0.4284 0.4297
DFA and Basel III 0.0564 0.1495 −0.0427 0.0238 0.8033 0.5764 0.0880 −0.0845 −0.0158 0.3022 0.6367
Largest positions in the hedge fund portfolio
Regulatory regime rp σr αp σe βMKT βSMB βHML βMOM V aR5% Ap SRp
GSA and Basel I 0.3030 0.1700 0.0747 0.0305 1.0498 0.1780 0.1329 −0.0746 −0.0158 0.0013 1.7650
GLBA and Basel I 0.2300 0.2065 0.1736 0.0409 1.0637 0.1627 0.1771 0.0026 −0.0191 0.0006 1.1801
GLBA and Basel II 0.1287 0.2004 0.0776 0.0271 1.0133 0.0621 −0.0215 0.0989 −0.213 0.0002 1.0286
DFA and Basel III 0.1728 0.1558 0.0215 0.0194 1.0106 −0.0022 −0.0553 −0.0023 −0.0163 0.0001 1.4255
The table reports the means of the estimated return, risk, and Amihud illiquidity metrics for the smallest and the largest positions in the bank
equity portfolio and the hedge fund equity portfolio, respectively, across the four regulatory regimes.
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A comparison of the return, risk, and illiquidity metrics of the small and large position
portfolios reveals a number of stark differences between the two, which occur in both
types of institutional portfolios. First and foremost, the portfolios comprising the posi-
tions with the largest weights are more profitable, both in terms of raw and risk-adjusted
returns, than their small position counterparts. Although total risk of the small position
portfolios is generally lower across the four regulatory regimes, their idiosyncratic volatil-
ities are higher than those of the large position portfolios in the two periods following the
introduction of Basel II. Finally, the large position portfolios are significantly less illiquid
than the small position portfolios.
Figures 7 and 8 show the risk-adjusted returns and idiosyncratic volatilities of the small
positions portfolios and the large positions portfolios, respectively. Although the risk-
adjusted returns of the two small position portfolios (Figure 7a) and their idiosyncratic
volatilities (Figure 7b) are nearly identical, the differences between the patterns of changes
for the large positions portfolios are more discernible, as demonstrated by Figures 8a and
8b. That notwithstanding, the two metrics are highly correlated across time for all four
portfolios, with correlation coefficients of 0.93 and 0.87 for risk-adjusted returns, and 0.96
and 0.93 for idiosyncratic volatilities of the small and the large positions, respectively.
However, the firm-specific risks of the size-based portfolios reach their maximum values
at different points in time during the sample period. For small positions, similarly to
the complete portfolios, idiosyncratic volatility reaches its highest value during the 2007
- 2009 Financial Crisis. In contrast, the firm-specific risk of the largest position portfolios
attain their highest levels in 2000:Q1, when the Dot-com bubble collapses.
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Figure 7: Risk-adjusted returns and idiosyncratic volatilities of the smallest positions in
bank and hedge fund portfolios 1997:Q1 - 2016:Q1
(a) Annualised risk-adjusted returns (b) Annualised idiosyncratic volatilities
Sub-figures (a) and (b) plot the annualised mean daily risk-adjusted returns and idiosyn-
cratic volatilities of the portfolios comprising the positions with weights below the 90th
percentile each quarter in the bank and hedge fund portfolios, respectively. The vertical
lines represent the bank regulatory policy change announcement dates. The shaded areas
correspond to recession periods as reported by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Figure 8: Risk-adjusted returns and idiosyncratic volatilities of the largest positions in
bank and hedge fund portfolios 1997:Q1 - 2016:Q1
(a) Annualised risk-adjusted returns (b) Annualised idiosyncratic volatilities
Sub-figures (a) and (b) plot the annualised mean daily risk-adjusted returns and idiosyn-
cratic volatilities of the portfolios comprising the positions with weights above the 90th
percentile each quarter in the bank and hedge fund portfolios, respectively. The vertical
lines represent the bank regulatory policy change announcement dates. The shaded areas
correspond to recession periods as reported by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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The changes in the Amihud illiquidity measure of the two small positions portfolios, shown
in Figure 9a, closely resemble those reported for the entire bank and hedge fund portfolios.
The portfolio of smallest positions held by banks is more illiquid than the benchmark
hedge fund portfolio, with its illiquidity peaking following the early 2000’s recession, but
becomes less illiquid in the period following the introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act and
Basel III. In stark contrast, the portfolios of largest positions not only display highly
comparable patterns of changes in illiquidity, becoming considerably less illiquid during
the sample period, but also exhibit lower illiquidity than the market portfolio.
Figure 9: Illiquidity of the size-based bank and hedge fund portfolios 1997:Q1 - 2016:Q1
(a) Illiquidity of the small positions bank and
hedge fund portfolios
(b) Illiquidity of the large positions bank and
hedge fund portfolios
Sub-figures (a) and (b) plot the Amihud illiquidity measure of the portfolios comprising
the positions with weights below the 90th percentile each quarter in the bank and hedge
fund portfolios, respectively. The vertical lines represent the bank regulatory policy change
announcement dates. The shaded areas correspond to recession periods as reported by the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
The results of t-tests comparing the mean and variance of the return, risk, and illiquidity
statistics of the four size-based portfolios in the periods before and after a regulatory
intervention are reported in Table 6. Comparing the results of tests based on the size-
based portfolios with those reported in Table 4, allows us to determine whether any of the
changes observed in the complete portfolios can be attributed to the changes exhibited
by either the small positions or the large positions portfolios.
The changes in the loadings on the size and value risk factors occurring following the
introduction of Basel II are statistically significant across all four size-based portfolios,
and of orders of magnitude comparable to those identified for the complete portfolios. In
contrast, although the changes in idiosyncratic volatility of the entire bank equity port-
folio, and of its large positions, are statistically significant following each of the three
regulatory developments, only the portfolio of small positions exhibits a statistically sig-
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nificant increase after the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and no significant
changes afterwards. Although we identify a similar pattern of changes in the idiosyn-
cratic volatilities of the small and large position hedge fund portfolios, only the reduction
in firm-specific volatility of the entire hedge fund portfolio in the period following the
announcement of the Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III is statistically significant. Similarly,
while we find that the decrease in the Amihud illiquidity measure of the two large position
portfolios are statistically significant, only the changes manifest by the bank portfolio of
small positions are statistically significant and conform with our results for the entire
bank portfolio.
This leads us to conclude that the changes in the idiosyncratic volatilities and Amihud
illiquidity measures of the complete institutional portfolios are driven by the developments
occurring within the large positions portfolio in the former case, and within the small
positions portfolio in the latter case.
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Table 6: Changes in average portfolio characteristics of the smallest and largest positions
Smallest positions in the bank portfolio
Policy development rp σr αp σe βMKT βSMB βHML βMOM V aR5% Ap SRp
GLBA 0.0042 0.0307 0.0210 0.0121∗ −0.1534∗∗∗ −0.1105∗∗ 0.1298∗∗ −0.0053 −0.0027 0.7052∗∗ −0.5498
(0.02) (1.51) (0.42) (1.85) (−3.58) (−2.39) (2.30) (−0.12) (−1.25) (2.45) (−0.35)
Basel II −0.0984 0.0314 −0.0553 −0.0076 0.0288 −0.1198∗∗∗ −0.2941∗∗∗ 0.1226∗∗∗ −0.0049 −0.8627∗∗∗ −0.6622
(−0.71) (1.02) (−1.42) (−1.21) (1.11) (−3.96) (−6.76) (2.98) (−1.47) (−4.08) (−0.73)
DFA and Basel III 0.0462 −0.0298 −0.0099 −0.0068 0.0708∗∗∗ 0.0475∗ −0.0472 −0.0765∗ 0.0039 −0.2132∗∗ 0.2740
(0.43) (−1.02) (−0.36) (−1.44) (4.01) (1.87) (−1.33) (−1.92) (1.25) (−2.02) (1.15)
Largest positions in the bank portfolio
Policy development rp σr αp σe βMKT βSMB βHML βMOM V aR5% Ap SRp
GLBA −0.0848 0.0344 0.0613 0.0108∗ 0.0353 0.0655 0.0170 0.1183∗∗ −0.0032 −0.0010∗∗∗ −0.8025
(−0.56) (1.60) (1.25) (1.96) (0.94) (1.47) (0.27) (2.63) (−1.58) (−6.49) (−0.92)
Basel II −0.1180 0.0048 −0.0848∗∗ −0.0161∗∗∗ −0.0185 −0.0849∗∗∗ −0.1682∗∗∗ 0.0205 −0.0032 −0.0005∗∗∗ −0.3638
(−1.13) (0.14) (−2.57) (−4.22) (−0.81) (−3.61) (−3.89) (0.65) (−0.84) (−9.90) (−0.66)
DFA and Basel III 0.0719 −0.0489 −0.0477∗∗∗ −0.0067∗∗∗ −0.0279∗∗∗ −0.0667∗∗∗ −0.0611∗∗ −0.0315 0.0058 −0.0001∗∗∗ 0.5769
(0.86) (−1.51) (−2.85) (−3.12) (−2.69) (−5.73) (−2.03) (−1.25) (1.60) (−5.39) (1.29)
Table continued overleaf.
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Table 6 (continued): Changes in average portfolio characteristics of the smallest and largest positions
Smallest positions in the hedge fund portfolio
Policy development rp σr αp σe βMKT βSMB βHML βMOM V aR5% Ap SRp
GLBA 0.0117 0.0444∗∗ 0.0570 0.0090∗ −0.0889∗∗ −0.0870∗∗ 0.1244∗∗∗ −0.0160 −0.0040∗ −0.0090 −0.5375
(0.06) (2.13) (1.43) (2.02) (−2.43) (−2.11) (2.91) (−0.37) (−1.86) (−0.15) (−0.35)
Basel II −0.1117 0.0193 −0.0686∗ −0.0026 −0.0431∗ −0.1278∗∗∗ −0.2742∗∗∗ 0.1221∗∗∗ −0.0040 −0.0328 −0.6490
(−0.78) (0.61) (−1.99) (−0.45) (−1.92) (−4.83) (−7.54) (3.04) (−1.15) (0.23) (−0.76)
DFA and Basel III 0.0329 −0.0359 −0.0236 −0.0068 0.0341∗∗ 0.0295 −0.0583∗ −0.0710∗ 0.0044 −0.1262 0.2070
(0.30) (−1.20) (−0.90) (−1.39) (2.15) (1.28) (−1.85) (−1.90) (1.36) (−0.98) (0.34)
Largest positions in the hedge fund portfolio
Policy development rp σr αp σe βMKT βSMB βHML βMOM V aR5% Ap SRp
GLBA −0.0729 0.0364 0.0988∗∗ 0.0103∗∗ 0.0139 −0.0152 0.0442 0.0773 −0.0033 −0.0007∗∗∗ −0.5848
(−0.44) (1.65) (2.06) (2.11) (0.39) (−0.29) (0.78) (1.24) (−1.66) (−6.50) (−0.66)
Basel II −0.1013 −0.0060 −0.0960∗∗∗ −0.0138∗∗∗ −0.0505∗∗ −0.1007∗∗∗ −0.1987∗∗∗ 0.0962∗ −0.0022 −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.1515
(−0.91) (−0.17) (−3.14) (−3.70) (−2.17) (−3.45) (−5.02) (1.91) (−0.64) (−7.05) (−0.27)
DFA and Basel III 0.0441 −0.0446 −0.0561∗∗∗ −0.0077∗∗∗ −0.0026 −0.0643∗∗∗ −0.0338 −0.1012∗∗ 0.0049 −0.0001∗∗∗ 0.3968
(0.49) (−1.39) (−3.33) (−3.16) (−0.21) (−5.41) (−1.09) (−2.43) (1.45) (−4.73) (0.86)
The table reports changes in the mean of the estimated return, risk, and Amihud illiquidity metrics for the portfolios comprising the smallest




We now present the results of difference-in-differences analysis. This is undertaken in order
to establish whether the changes in the return, risk, and illiquidity characteristics of the
bank equity portfolio we have identified are driven by regulatory policy developments. To
this end, we base our tests on the differences between the bank portfolio and the market
portfolio, the hedge fund portfolio and the market portfolio, and the bank portfolio and
the hedge fund portfolio. We posit that for each portfolio metric, if the tests indicate
that the differences between the bank portfolio and the market portfolio, and the bank
portfolio and the hedge fund portfolio are statistically significant, while those between
the hedge fund portfolio and the market portfolio are not, then the changes in the metric
of interest can be attributed to a particular bank regulatory policy development and not
to a change in market conditions. We report the results of the test based on the complete
bank and hedge fund portfolios in Table 7.
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Table 7: Difference-in-differences results
Bank portfolio − Market portfolio
Policy development rp σr αp σe βMKT βSMB βHML βMOM V aR5% Ap SRp
GLBA 0.1842 0.0074 −0.0214 0.0101∗ −0.0997∗ −0.1092∗ 0.1361 −0.0177 −0.0006 0.6585∗∗ 0.8682
(1.65) (0.56) (−0.29) (1.90) (−2.00) (−1.78) (1.63) (−0.33) (−0.38) (2.36) (0.94)
Basel II −0.0099 0.0321∗∗∗ 0.0281 −0.0226∗∗∗ −0.0117 −0.1182∗∗∗ −0.3206∗∗∗ 0.0614 −0.0021∗ −0.8026∗∗∗ −0.4651
(−0.15) (3.49) (0.56) (−5.04) (−0.36) (−2.97) (−6.03) (1.57) (−1.92) (−4.05) (−1.06)
DFA and Basel III −0.0259 0.0106∗ 0.0281 −0.0080∗∗ 0.0759∗∗∗ 0.0359 −0.0233 0.0020 −0.0009 −0.1947∗∗ −0.2516
(−0.82) (1.95) (1.13) (−2.53) (4.38) (1.38) (−0.67) (0.06) (−1.46) (−2.14) (−1.11)
Hedge fund portfolio − Market portfolio
Policy development rp σr αp σe βMKT βSMB βHML βMOM V aR5% Ap SRp
GLBA 0.2190∗∗ 0.0162 0.0353 0.0047 −0.0345 −0.0522 0.0827 0.0249 −0.0011 −0.0161 0.7538
(2.43) (1.44) (0.84) (1.36) (−0.93) (−1.20) (1.16) (0.57) (−0.81) (−0.26) (0.99)
Basel II −0.0710 0.0247∗∗∗ −0.0256 −0.0075 −0.0876∗∗∗ −0.1108∗∗∗ −0.2789∗∗∗ 0.0599 −0.0021∗∗ −0.0250 −0.6187∗
(−1.24) (2.91) (−0.67) (−1.47) (−4.04) (−3.92) (−6.38) (1.66) (−2.32) (−0.27) (−1.87)
DFA and Basel III −0.0153 0.0027 0.0315 −0.0050 0.0464∗∗∗ 0.0208 −0.0115 −0.0406 −0.0001 −0.0631 −0.2116
(−0.42) (0.45) (1.09) (−1.55) (3.15) (0.91) (−0.46) (−1.32) (−0.14) (−0.79) (−0.98)
Bank portfolio − Hedge fund portfolio
Policy development rp σr αp σe βMKT βSMB βHML βMOM V aR5% Ap SRp
GLBA −0.0348 −0.0087 −0.0566 0.0055 −0.0653∗ −0.0570 0.0534 −0.0426 0.0004 0.6746∗∗∗ 0.1144
(−0.86) (−1.31) (−1.06) (1.59) (−1.74) (−1.06) (0.90) (−0.85) (0.49) (2.92) (0.36)
Basel II 0.0610∗∗ 0.0075 0.0537∗ −0.0150∗∗∗ 0.0759∗∗∗ −0.0075 −0.0418 0.0015 0.0000 −0.7776∗∗∗ 0.1536
(2.19) (1.63) (1.71) (−6.72) (3.10) (−0.22) (−1.09) (0.05) (0.07) (−5.37) (0.89)
DFA and Basel III −0.0106 0.0079∗∗∗ −0.0034 −0.0030∗∗ 0.0295∗ 0.0151 −0.0119 0.0426∗∗ −0.0008∗∗ −0.1316∗∗∗ −0.0400
(−0.65) (3.03) (−0.21) (−2.33) (1.98) (0.82) (−0.43) (2.05) (−2.44) (−4.77) (−0.41)
The table reports the results of difference-in-differences tests. The first difference is between the return, risk, and illiquidity metrics of either the
bank or the hedge fund portfolio and the benchmark portfolio. The second difference is between the period following a policy change and the
preceding period. t-statistics in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote 10%, 5% and 1$ level of significance.
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Our analysis so far identifies the idiosyncratic volatility and the Amihud illiquidity mea-
sure of the bank portfolio as the two metrics which exhibit statistically significant differ-
ences following the three regulatory innovations during the sample period. Accordingly,
they are the main focus of our discussion.
Although the increase in idiosyncratic volatility of the bank portfolio during the period of
deregulation initiated by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act relative to the market portfolio is
statistically significant, it is statistically indistinguishable from the increase in firm-specific
risk of the hedge fund portfolio. However, the results for the periods following the intro-
duction of Basel II, as well as the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act and the announcement
of Basel III, show that the reduction in the idiosyncratic volatility of the bank portfolio,
relative to both the market portfolio and the hedge fund portfolio, is highly statistically
significant. At the same time, the changes in idiosyncratic volatility of the hedge fund
portfolio relative to the market portfolio are statistically insignificant. This allows us
to conclude that introduction of higher bank capital requirements and prohibiting banks
from engaging in proprietary trading both lead to a significant reduction in the overall
firm-specific risk of the equity positions they hold.
In terms of the Amihud illiquidity measure, the test results indicate a robust relation be-
tween the illiquidity of banks’ equity holdings and changes in the regulatory environment
within which they operate. The removal of any formal restrictions preventing banks from
engaging in securities trading brought about by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, has led to
a statistically and economically significant increase in the illiquidity of bank portfolios,
relative to both the market and the hedge fund portfolios. In contrast, the subsequent
announcement initiating Basel II regulations, and the Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III all
result in significant increases of the bank portfolio’s liquidity in relation to the market
portfolio and the hedge fund portfolio. This evidence suggests that financial deregula-
tion prompts banking institutions to invest in more illiquid stocks, while policies aimed
at either increasing bank capital requirements or reducing the scope of their activities
in financial markets force banks to rebalance their portfolio towards more liquid posi-
tions.
To ensure the robustness of our main results, we repeat the tests using the small posi-
tions and the large positions bank and hedge fund portfolios. The results are reported in
Tables 8 and 9. In contrast to the results discussed so far, we find that the introduction
of Basel II appears as the sole regulatory development which results in a statistically
significant reduction in idiosyncratic volatility of the small positions bank portfolio rel-
ative to both the market and the hedge fund portfolios. However, as shown in Table 6,
the mean and variance of firm-specific risk of the small positions portfolio held by banks
during that period is not statistically different from the preceding regulatory regime. Fur-
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thermore, while the changes in the idiosyncratic volatility of the large positions portfolio
conform to our previous findings when assessed in relation to the market portfolio, they
are not statistically different relative to changes exhibited by the large positions portfolio
of hedge funds. Additionally, although the difference-in-differences analysis of changes in
the Amihud illiquidity metrics of the small positions portfolios fully supports the results
documented for the entire portfolio, the results of the tests carried out on the large posi-
tions portfolio are not conclusive. We attribute this to the considerably greater illiquidity
of the market portfolio, which results in difference-in-differences estimates that predom-
inantly reflect the effects of changes in the liquidity of the market portfolio, rather than
either of the two institutional portfolios.
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Table 8: Difference-in-differences results for the small positions portfolios
Bank portfolio − Market portfolio
Policy development rp σr αp σe βMKT βSMB βHML βMOM V aR5% Ap SRp
GLBA 0.1675 0.0043 −0.0551 0.0095∗ −0.1181∗∗∗ −0.0945∗∗ 0.1236∗ −0.0285 −0.0003 0.7132∗∗ 0.3572
(1.63) (0.32) (−0.92) (1.92) (−2.84) (−2.06) (1.93) (−0.68) (−0.20) (2.50) (0.36)
Basel II −0.0436 0.0410∗∗∗ 0.0097 −0.0076∗∗∗ 0.0079 −0.1182∗∗∗ −0.3085∗∗∗ 0.0930∗∗∗ −0.0033∗∗∗ −0.8517∗∗∗ −0.5936
(−0.67) (4.89) (0.20) (−1.60) (0.34) (−4.07) (−7.25) (2.74) (−3.55) (−4.07) (−1.30)
DFA and Basel III −0.0167 0.0122∗∗ 0.0332 −0.0040 0.0854∗∗∗ 0.0606∗∗ −0.0184 −0.0195 −0.0010 −0.2096∗∗ −0.2612
(−0.44) (2.48) (1.08) (−1.09) (6.11) (2.63) (−0.64) (−0.64) (−1.60) (−2.01) (−1.00)
Hedge fund portfolio − Market portfolio
Policy development rp σr αp σe βMKT βSMB βHML βMOM V aR5% Ap SRp
GLBA 0.1750 0.0180 −0.0191 0.0065∗∗ −0.0536 −0.0710∗ 0.1182∗∗ −0.0392 −0.0016 −0.0011 0.3695
(1.68) (1.51) (−0.37) (2.18) (−1.50) (−1.75) (2.27) (−0.95) (−1.18) (−0.02) (0.39)
Basel II −0.0569 0.0290∗∗∗ −0.0036 −0.0026 −0.0639∗∗∗ −0.1263∗∗∗ −0.2886∗∗∗ 0.0926∗∗∗ −0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0438 −0.5804
(−0.88) (3.62) (−0.09) (−0.60) (−3.19) (−4.94) (−8.25) (2.75) (−2.74) (0.31) (−1.49)
DFA and Basel III −0.0300 0.0061 0.0195 −0.0040 0.0487∗∗∗ 0.0426∗∗ −0.0296 −0.0140 −0.0005 −0.1225 −0.3283
(−0.75) (1.17) (0.65) (−1.04) (3.70) (2.01) (−1.23) (−0.48) (−0.79) (−0.97) (−1.33)
Bank portfolio − Hedge fund portfolio
Policy development rp σr αp σe βMKT βSMB βHML βMOM V aR5% Ap SRp
GLBA −0.0075 −0.0137∗∗∗ −0.0360∗ 0.0031 −0.0645∗∗∗ −0.0235 0.0054 0.0107 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.7143∗∗∗ −0.0123
(−0.26) (−3.49) (−1.76) (1.21) (−3.23) (−1.01) (0.19) (0.50) (3.23) (3.04) (−0.07)
Basel II 0.0133 0.0121∗∗∗ 0.0133 −0.0050∗∗∗ 0.0718∗∗∗ 0.0080 −0.0199 0.0004 −0.0009∗∗∗ −0.8955∗∗∗ −0.0131
(0.72) (4.43) (1.05) (−3.08) (5.54) (0.51) (−1.25) (0.03) (−2.75) (−6.02) (−0.12)
DFA and Basel III 0.0134 0.0061∗∗∗ 0.0137 −0.0000 0.0367∗∗∗ 0.0180 0.0111 −0.0055 −0.0005∗ −0.0871∗∗∗ 0.0670
(1.38) (3.73) (1.61) (−0.04) (4.38) (1.61) (1.04) (−0.53) (−1.73) (−2.89) (1.09)
The table reports the results of difference-in-differences tests. The first difference is between the return, risk, and illiquidity metrics for the
smallest positions in either the bank or the hedge fund portfolio and the benchmark portfolio. The second difference is between the period
following a policy change and the preceding period. t-statistics in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote 10%, 5% and 1$ level of significance.
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Table 9: Difference-in-differences results for the large positions portfolios
Bank portfolio − Market portfolio
Policy development rp σr αp σe βMKT βSMB βHML βMOM V aR5% Ap SRp
GLBA 0.0785 0.0080 −0.0148 0.0082∗∗ 0.0706∗ 0.0815∗ 0.0108 0.0951∗∗ −0.0008 0.0069∗∗ 0.1044
(1.54) (1.56) (−0.37) (2.07) (1.84) (1.77) (0.18) (2.10) (−0.97) (2.51) (0.34)
Basel II −0.0631∗∗ 0.0145∗∗∗ −0.0198 −0.0162∗∗∗ −0.0394∗ −0.0833∗∗∗ −0.1826∗∗∗ −0.0090 −0.0016∗∗ 0.0105∗∗∗ −0.2952∗
(−2.12) (4.18) (−0.74) (−6.35) (−1.71) (−3.37) (−4.61) (−0.34) (−2.57) (4.38) (−1.74)
DFA and Basel III 0.0090 −0.0069∗∗∗ −0.0046 −0.0039∗∗∗ −0.0133 −0.0536∗∗∗ −0.0324 0.0255 0.0008 0.0036∗∗ 0.0416
(0.86) (−3.01) (−0.36) (−3.23) (−1.41) (−3.96) (−1.21) (1.36) (1.93) (2.05) (0.55)
Hedge fund portfolio − Market portfolio
Policy development rp σr αp σe βMKT βSMB βHML βMOM V aR5% Ap SRp
GLBA 0.0904∗∗ 0.0100∗∗ 0.0228 0.0078∗∗ 0.0492 0.0008 0.0380 0.0541 −0.0008 0.0072∗∗ 0.3221
(2.52) (2.18) (0.68) (2.41) (1.35) (0.01) (0.64) (0.90) (−1.08) (2.56) (1.43)
Basel II −0.0465∗ 0.0036 −0.0310 −0.0138∗∗∗ −0.0713∗∗∗ −0.0991∗∗∗ −0.2131∗∗∗ 0.0667 −0.0007 0.0106∗∗∗ −0.0829
(−1.91) (1.06) (−1.35) (−6.36) (−3.19) (−3.40) (−6.01) (1.63) (−1.38) (4.43) (−0.57)
DFA and Basel III −0.0188 −0.0026 −0.0130 −0.0049∗∗∗ 0.0119 −0.0512∗∗∗ −0.0050 −0.0442 −0.0000 0.0035∗∗ −0.1385
(−1.03) (−0.95) (−0.87) (−6.36) (1.14) (−4.78) (−0.20) (−1.53) (−0.03) (2.05) (−1.26)
Bank portfolio − Hedge fund portfolio
Policy development rp σr αp σe βMKT βSMB βHML βMOM V aR5% Ap SRp
GLBA −0.0119 −0.0020 −0.0376 0.0004 0.0214 0.0808∗ −0.0272 0.0410 0.0000 −0.0003∗∗ −0.2177
(−0.40) (−0.43) (−1.36) (0.16) (0.99) (1.97) (−0.59) (1.10) (0.06) (−2.53) (−1.46)
Basel II −0.0167 0.0109∗∗∗ 0.0112 −0.0023 0.0319∗∗ 0.0158 0.0305 −0.0757∗∗ −0.0009∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.2123∗
(−0.78) (3.03) (0.60) (−1.38) (2.22) (0.78) (0.74) (−2.68) (−1.71) (−4.49) (−1.84)
DFA and Basel III 0.0278∗ −0.0043 0.0084 0.0010 −0.0253∗ −0.0025 −0.0273 0.0697∗∗ 0.0008∗ 0.0000 0.1801∗∗
(1.79) (−1.47) (0.77) (0.93) (−1.95) (−0.19) (−0.81) (2.63) (1.79) (1.18) (2.05)
The table reports the results of difference-in-differences tests. The first difference is between the return, risk, and illiquidity metrics for the largest
positions in either the bank or the hedge fund portfolio and the benchmark portfolio. The second difference is between the period following a
policy change and the preceding period. t-statistics in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote 10%, 5% and 1$ level of significance.
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4.3 Discussion and policy implications
Collectively, our results indicate the existence of a statistically significant negative rela-
tion between the regulatory burden faced by banking institutions and the idiosyncratic
volatilities and illiquidity measures of their equity portfolios. While our tests show that
the illiquidity of the entire portfolio is driven by the small positions in the portfolio, we
are unable to fully confirm that the changes in the firm-specific risk of the portfolio are
predominantly a reflection of changes in the positions with the largest weights in the
portfolio. That notwithstanding, our study offers a number of important implications for
the design of regulatory frameworks applied to institutional investors.
The significant reductions in idiosyncratic volatility and illiquidity of bank equity portfo-
lios following the inclusion of provisions for market risk in bank regulatory capital frame-
works, the increases in regulatory capital requirements and the introduction of specific
liquidity targets for banks all contribute to the achievement of the objectives of macropru-
dential policies. A more liquid equity portfolio serves as an additional asset which banks
can quickly and efficiently convert into cash, allowing them to appropriately respond to
potential liquidity shortfalls.
Furthermore, our results suggest that the decrease in the overall illiquidity of banks’
equity holdings is a result of a transition towards more liquid positions with the smallest
weights in the portfolio. As such, this indicates that regulatory interventions may reduce
banks’ willingness to hold inventories of illiquid equities. This may adversely affect their
ability to act as market-makers. We find that the illiquidity of the smallest positions held
by hedge funds remains largely unchanged during the period we study, and exceeds the
illiquidity of the bank portfolio following the latest regulatory policy developments.
One consequence of this development is that it could allow hedge funds to maintain a
steady provision of market-making services even when banking institutions reduce the ex-
tent of their participation in this process. However, this also means that the policymakers
face the possibility that the essential service of market-making will increasingly be pro-
vided by financial institutions which do not have to comply with any capital requirements
and are less transparent than banks.
5 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the growing body of literature evaluating the effects of regula-
tory policy developments on banks’ trading activities in a number of financial markets.
Specifically, it examines the relation between policy innovations occurring between 1997
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and 2016 and the changes in return, risk, and illiquidity characteristics of the equity
portfolio held by the banking sector.
Our analysis is based on a comprehensive sample of equity holdings reported by U.S.
bank holding companies and by independent hedge funds. It utilises multiple difference-
in-differences tests to ascertain whether the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, the
2004 and 2010 reforms of the Basel capital requirements, and the passage of the Dodd-
Frank Act in 2010 lead to statistically significant changes in the portfolio characteristics
of bank equity holdings.
We establish that both the idiosyncratic volatility and the illiquidity of banks’ equity
portfolio increase significantly during the period of deregulation initiated by the repeal
of the Glass-Steagall Act. Those changes, however, are subsequently reversed by the
consecutive Basel reforms and the Dodd-Frank Act. Importantly, we demonstrate that
the changes in the illiquidity of the bank portfolio are driven by the positions with the
smallest portfolio weights.
The results we document in this paper demonstrate that the changes in the characteristics
of bank equity holdings conform with the broad objectives of macroprudential policies,
due to the reductions in their idiosyncratic volatility and illiquidity. However, they also
indicate that banks’ ability to act as market-makers in equities may have been adversely
affected by the recent policy developments, increasing the likelihood that this role will be
fulfilled by hedge funds or other institutional investors operating outside the regulator’s
purview. The consequences of this effect for the long-term stability of the financial system
need to be monitored.
35
Bibliography
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Appendix A: Banking institutions included in the data
sample
The sample of banks used in this study includes the following financial institutions:
1. Bank of America Corporation;
2. The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation;
3. BB&T Corporation;
4. The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc.†;
5. Capital One Financial Corporation;
6. Citigroup, Inc., including Citicorp and Travelers Group;
7. Comerica, Inc.;
8. Fifth Third Bancorp;
9. The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.;
10. Huntington Bancshares, Inc.;
11. JPMorgan Chase & Co.;
12. KeyCorp;
13. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.†;
14. M&T Bank Corporation;
15. Merill Lynch & Co., Inc.†;
16. Morgan Stanley;
17. Northern Trust Corporation;
18. PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.;
19. Regions Financial Corporation;
20. State Street Corporation;
21. SunTrust Banks, Inc.;
22. U.S. Bancorp;
23. Wachovia†;
24. Wells Fargo & Company;
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25. Zions Bancorporation.
The institutions marked in bold are among the 38 firms selected by the Federal Reserve
to participate in the annual Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Reviews. The firms
marked by † either fail or are acquired by other bank holding companies during the 2007
- 2009 Financial Crisis.
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